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Funding for this evaluation was provided in whole by the Missouri Foundation for Health. 
Founded in 2000, MFH is an independent nonprofit organization and the largest nongovernmental funder 
of community health activities for the state. Having provided nearly $350 million in funding to date, MFH 
and its programs and grants support activities that improve the health of Missouri’s citizens, 
particularly the uninsured and underserved populations.
In 2004, the Missouri Foundation for Health (MFH) announced the nine-year Tobacco Prevention 
and Cessation Initiative (TPCI) focused on reducing the health effects and economic toll of tobacco 
use on Missouri residents. 
The first phase of TPCI (2005-2008) comprised three strategies:  
l  Strategy 1: Increase the Tax on Tobacco Products 
l	Strategy 2: Implement Smokefree Workplace Programs
l	Strategy 3: Promote School-Based Prevention Programs
Due to the significant investment MFH has made in TPCI, there was a need for an economic 
evaluation to assess the Foundation’s return on investment. This report presents the results 
from the economic evaluation conducted by the Center for Tobacco Policy Research (CTPR) at 
Washington University in St. Louis. Although there have been several economic evaluations of 
individual tobacco cessation and prevention programs, there have been few, if any, to date that 
have examined a tobacco control initiative with multiple strategies. For this analysis, CTPR focused 
on the first three strategies of TPCI.
Methods
Both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis approaches were used. The costs, benefits, and 
cost-to-benefit ratios for all three strategies were calculated individually and then combined. Due 
to the tobacco tax increase not passing, two different scenarios were assessed: 1) the actual election 
outcome of the tax not passing; and 2) the benefits that would have been gained if the tax had 
passed. In any economic evaluation a number of assumptions are made; this evaluation took the 
most conservative approach in its assumptions.  See the full report for a detailed description of the 
methods used, including the calculations of the costs and benefits, and all assumptions made.
Evaluation Highlights
The Initiative resulted in savings, despite the 
failure of the tobacco tax increase.
The total combined benefits for the three 
TPCI strategies during the time period 
resulted in real savings: 5,228 quality 
adjusted life years (QALYs) gained and 
long-term medical care savings of $30.5 
million. Therefore, a positive return on 
investment was seen in the “reality” 
scenario, despite the tobacco tax 
not passing. 
Executive Summary
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Costs
QALYs Gained*




















TPCI costs and benefits for the two tax scenarios
Center for Tobacco Policy Research
The success of the tobacco tax strategy would have increased the positive net benefit 
of TPCI twenty-fold. 
Had the tobacco tax ballot initiative passed, the strategy would have resulted in large benefits 
both in regard to QALYs and long-term medical savings for the people of Missouri.  For every $1 
spent on TPCI, there would have been medical care savings of $87.24 vs. $4.32. 
Policy changes result in the 
largest benefit.
Grantees from both the school and 
workplace strategies were involved 
in advocating for policy changes, 
in addition to providing cessation 
services and educational programs 
in the schools. Within the school and 
workplace-based strategies, smoke-
free policy changes, particularly on 
the community level, showed two 
to six times higher cost-benefit/cost-
effectiveness ratios in comparison 
to cessation services and youth 
education programs.
Conclusions
The results of our economic evaluation for TPCI during the specified time period show a net 
positive benefit across the entire initiative, as well as for the workplace and youth prevention 
strategies individually. These results provide valuable lessons learned and important information 
for future TPCI efforts, other tobacco prevention efforts, and decisions regarding MFH’s future 
efforts to improve the health of Missourians in its service area. Due to current plans for the 
initiative to continue an additional four years, the information presented in this report should 
inform future decisions on interventions to support within TPCI as well as the level of resources 
to dedicate to TPCI efforts. Based on the evaluation findings, the following recommendations 
were identified:
Recommendations
l	Advocate for an increase in the tobacco tax.
l  Emphasize policy interventions as a main component of a comprehensive  
  effort to reduce tobacco use.
l  Continue to conduct cost analyses for the Tobacco Prevention and 
  Cessation Initiative and expand the practice to all Missouri Foundation  
  for Health initiatives.   
QALYs gained for components of the 






















Program Components of TPCI Strategies
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Due to the burden of tobacco use in Missouri and limited funding for tobacco prevention and 
cessation programs, the Missouri Foundation for Health (MFH) identified tobacco use as a major 
health issue in its service area of 84 counties and the City of St. Louis. In 2004, MFH announced 
the nine-year Tobacco Prevention and Cessation Initiative (TPCI) focused on reducing the health 
effects and economic toll of tobacco use on Missouri residents. 
The first phase of TPCI (2005-2008) comprised three strategies:  
l  Strategy 1: Increase the Tax on Tobacco Products An education campaign to increase 
  awareness about the effectiveness of increasing the price of tobacco products on preventing     
  youth from smoking and  increasing the number of adults who quit. 
l	 Strategy 2: Implement Smokefree Workplace Programs A workplace and community strategy 
  for which grantees increase access to cessation resources (e.g., classes) and advocate for 
  smokefree workplaces.
l		Strategy 3: Promote School-Based Prevention Programs A youth-focused strategy that included  
  three different programs carried out in Missouri schools that educated students on the burden   
  of tobacco use and promoted youth advocating for policy change. 
In subsequent years, TPCI has added two other strategies: eliminating tobacco-related disparities 
and supporting local tobacco control policy change. In total, MFH has supported more than 70 
organizations, contractors, and partners’ efforts to implement tobacco prevention and cessation 
programming, with more than $22 million in grants since the beginning of the initiative. 
In any public health initiative, stakeholders often question whether the investment can be 
justified by the outcomes. Due to the significant investment MFH has made in TPCI, there was 
a need for an economic evaluation to assess the Foundation’s return on investment. This report 
presents the results from the economic evaluation conducted by the Center for Tobacco Policy 
Research at Washington University in St. Louis. Although there have been several economic 
evaluations of individual tobacco cessation and prevention programs, there have been few, if any, 
to date that have examined a tobacco control initiative with multiple strategies. For this analysis, 
CTPR focused on the first three strategies of TPCI. This will serve as the first of additional 
economic analyses that will be conducted during the remainder of TPCI.
Introduction
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Methods
Standard methods for economic evaluations were used.1 The costs, benefits, and cost-to-benefit 
ratios for all three strategies were calculated individually and then combined. In any economic 
evaluation a number of assumptions are made; this evaluation took the most conservative 
approach in its assumptions. A detailed description of the assumptions on costs, benefits, and 
their valuation in monetary terms is included in the Appendix. 
For this evaluation, both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis approaches were used. A 
cost-effectiveness analysis allows different interventions to be assessed based on what it costs to 
achieve a particular outcome (e.g., smoking cessation). A strength of cost-effectiveness analysis 
is that it allows combining cost data with outcome or effectiveness data (i.e., few adjustments 
have to be made).1 If a program has a strong and 
comprehensive evaluation, those data are often 
available. A challenge with cost-effectiveness 
analysis is that you can only make comparisons 
with programs that have the same outcome. 
For cost-benefit analysis, costs and benefits 
are assessed in monetary terms. Thus, each 
intervention can be examined on its own and 
compared to interventions with different 
objectives. The difficulty of assigning a value 
to particular outcomes can make cost-benefit 
analysis a challenge. We applied both approaches 
for economic evaluations to allow for examining 
the costs of a particular outcome, as well as 
comparisons in monetary terms across and within 
the TPCI strategies. 
Benefits were measured in quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs) gained and life-time medical 
care savings per smoker who quit or youth 
prevented from smoking. A discount rate of 
3% was used. This is not to be confused with 
adjusting for inflation. Discount rates are used to 
adjust for costs, benefits, etc. distributed across 
time.1 Money that is received today is usually 
considered more valuable than the same amount 




l	Benefits are assessed in terms of 
  outcomes (e.g., youth prevented 
  from smoking)
l  Analysis identifies the cost of      
  achieving a specific outcome
l  E.g., The program costs $350 per    
  smoker who stays quit
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
l	All benefits and costs are described  
  in monetary terms
l  Analysis determines if the cost is   
  less than the value of the benefit
l  E.g., For every dollar spent, $5,000  
  is saved in medical care costs 
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Calculation of Costs
The time periods for the three TPCI strategies assessed were:
l	Strategy 1 – Campaign to Increase Tobacco Tax: 2005-2006
l	Strategies 2 & 3 – School and Workplace Programs: 2007-2008
The efforts to increase the tobacco tax took place during the two-year period of 2005 & 2006 only. 
For the school and workplace strategies, the time period selected was based on the availability of 
comprehensive data. In January 2007, grantees began reporting data on their efforts via an online 
data collection system. 
Only direct program costs were included in the analyses. Costs not included for any of the 
strategies were MFH staff salaries, costs associated with the initiative evaluation, trainings for 
grantees, and other capacity building activities not directly related to grantees’ programs. For 
the tobacco tax strategy, the total funding provided by MFH for the education portion of the 
tobacco tax initiative was determined. The funding contributed by other organizations for both 
the education portion as well as the political campaign was also calculated. These costs did not 
include volunteer hours as those data were not available. The program was heavily dependent 
on volunteers; unfortunately, records only show the number of volunteers involved and not the 
amount of time they contributed.
For the workplace and school strategies, we combined the amount of funding distributed by MFH 
to all grantees implementing programs specifically for these two strategies. For each grantee, we 
divided its funding by the number of months in its grant award. This allowed us to come up with 
an estimate of funding for grantees with grants that preceded or continued after the time period 
we were evaluating (i.e., 2007-2008). 
For grantees that were funded to implement both strategies, it was unclear how much was 
allocated to each strategy. Therefore, after calculating the amount of funding for the time period, 
the amount was divided in half for each strategy. Funding amounts for grantees for which there 
were no records of their activities for the specified time period, 8 out of 44, were not included in 
the analyses. Additional funding grantees received to implement their programs were also added 
to the total costs along with the value of volunteer hours. 
Calculation of Benefits
Data used in the calculation of benefits were provided by grantees and in most cases were 
estimates. There are other benefits not accounted for that may have resulted from these programs, 
including capacity-building within the grantee communities. Therefore, in many ways we took 
the most conservative approach in calculating the benefits of TPCI’s programs.   
To keep the analyses standard across all three strategies, two primary benefits that could be 
calculated were chosen: quality-adjusted life years gained (QALYs) and lifetime medical care 
savings. These benefits are common in cost-benefit analyses and can be calculated whether you 
are examining adults who quit or youth prevented from smoking. 
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Effectiveness of a Tobacco Tax
In assessing the tobacco tax strategy, two different scenarios were examined. The first scenario 
was the actual election outcome, the failure to pass the tobacco tax increase. In November 2006, 
Missouri voters rejected the proposed tax increase; 51.4% against, 48.6% in support. The number 
of adults influenced to quit or youth influenced to not start because of the educational campaign 
were assumed to be minimal and not included in the analysis of benefits. The second scenario 
was hypothetical scenario based on the benefits that would have been gained if the tobacco tax 
increase had passed. Increasing the price of tobacco products is one of the best ways to reduce 
tobacco use initiation and increase cessation.4 The strategy of increasing Missouri’s tobacco tax 
will continue to be a recommended practice for the state and thus warranted further examination 
of the benefits that would have been gained if the tax increase had passed. 
To calculate the anticipated benefits if the tax had passed, established price elasticity measures 
from the literature on tobacco taxes were used.2,3 Price elasticity measures the responsiveness of a 
variable (e.g., cigarette sales) to a change in price. For example, for every 10% increase in the price 
of cigarettes, it is estimated that cigarette consumption is reduced by 3-5%. Since youth and young 
adults are more responsive to price increases, price elasticities by age group were used, starting 
with 15-17 year olds.3 The estimated decrease in smoking prevalence was calculated for each age 
group. Then, the number of smokers anticipated to quit based on the decrease in prevalence was 
determined. Data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)5 conducted during 
the time period when the tobacco tax increase would have gone into effect were used to calculate 
the number of smokers who would quit.  
Effectiveness of Smokefree Policy Change
The same procedure described in Ong and Glantz’s 2005 paper to determine the number of 
smokers who would quit as a result of the passage of a smokefree policy was followed for this 
evaluation.6 The procedure accounts for smokers who would quit anyway, a 90% compliance rate 
for community-wide policy changes, and a 35% relapse rate. Data provided by grantees on policy 
changes they were involved in during the time period were used in the calculation. This included 
grantees who were involved in workplace and school-based strategies. Community-wide policy 
changes were separated from individual worksite policy changes, though the numbers used in the 
calculations were the same, except for the compliance rate, which was only used with community 
policies. One hundred percent compliance with smokefree policies was assumed for workplaces. 
The number of smokers within a community or a worksite was estimated based on a 23.2% 
prevalence rate for the state of Missouri from the 2006 BRFSS5, the year prior to policy changes 
taking place. Benefits from decreasing or eliminating exposure to secondhand smoke were not 
included in our calculations and would be considered to provide additional benefits.  
Effectiveness of Cessation Programs
The number of smokers who quit due to their involvement in TPCI-funded cessation classes was 
calculated using 12-month quit rate data collected via the TPCI online data collection system. 
All grantees were provided a protocol by CTPR to follow when conducting follow-up calls to 
assess whether program participants had stopped smoking at three, six, and twelve months after 
completing the cessation program. Based on previous research, we assumed a 35% relapse rate for 
those who quit.6,7 
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Table 1. Values used to calculate benefits of TPCI components
Benefit
QALYs generated per quitter*
QALYs generated per youth 
not initiating**
Excess lifetime medical 
expenditures for smokers***
Lifetime medical savings for youth 





*Keeler et al, 2002 and Ong & Glantz, 2005. 
**Kaplan et al, 2007 and Holtgrave et al, 2009
***Hodgson, 1992 (adjusted for inflation to 2007 dollars)
Effectiveness of Youth Prevention Programs
For the school-based strategy, the most conservative approach for estimating the number of youth 
affected by the programs was used. For two of the three programs, only the students reported 
to be trained by the grantees were counted. This is because these two programs were primarily 
focused on training middle and high school youth to educate their peers and conduct advocacy-
related activities. For the third program, the number of students reported to be involved in 
classroom activities was also counted, because a large portion of this program involved lessons 
and activities conducted in the classroom. Based on a rate of smoking initiation for youth 
estimated at 10.2% in previous research, the number of youth involved in the programs who 
would likely become established smokers was calculated.8 Then based on figures reported in the 
Institute of Medicine’s Ending the Tobacco Problem: A Blueprint for a Nation, it was estimated that 
youth programs would decrease the initiation rate by 10%.8 From there, the number of youth who 
would be less likely to initiate smoking due to their involvement in the programs was calculated.
Quality-Adjusted Life Years
Based on the number of adults who quit and 
the number of youth prevented from smoking, 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained were 
calculated. Quality-adjusted life years take into 
account both the quantity and quality of life 
gained by an intervention. Two different numbers 
for calculating QALYs gained were used; one 
for adults and one for youth. For adults quitting 
smoking, we used 1.58 QALYs gained per each 
sustained quitter based on several past studies.6,7 
This estimate assumes the average quitter is 45 
years of age and benefits of quitting cease after 
the age of 65. For youth, a previously reported estimate 
of 3.4 QALYs gained per youth who do not smoke 
was used.9,10 
What are QALYs?
l	Quality-adjusted life years take 
  into account both the quantity 
  and quality of life gained by a     
  health intervention.
l  A year of perfect health is worth 1;  
  a year of less than perfect health is  
  worth less than 1. 
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Results
The costs and benefits for each of the strategies are displayed in Table 2. The table shows the 
individual and total costs of the TPCI initiative. The total combined cost for the three TPCI 
strategies during the time period we assessed was $7,066,434. The totals for the actual election 
outcome (tax amendment failing) and the scenario of the tax passing are presented in two tables.  
Table 2 shows the total costs and benefits of all three strategies, with the tobacco tax increase not 
passing. The cost-to-benefit is expressed in two ways: cost of each QALY gained and the amount 
of long-term medical care savings per dollar spent. The table provides these measures for each 
individual strategy and the initiative as a whole. The tobacco tax strategy shows that there were 
no benefits gained from the educational campaign. The total combined benefits for the three TPCI 
strategies during the time period resulted in real savings: 5,228 QALYs gained and long-term 
medical care savings of $30.5 million. Therefore, a positive return on investment was seen in the 
“reality” scenario, despite the tobacco tax not passing. 








































In Table 3, the benefits for both the school and workplace strategies remain the same as in Table 
2; however, benefits gained from the tobacco tax strategy are distinctly different. A tobacco tax 
increase would have resulted in very large benefits for the people of Missouri: 100,298 QALYs and 
more than $585 million in long-term medical care savings. Had the tobacco tax ballot measure 
passed, the positive benefits-to-cost results would have been magnified twenty-fold; for every $1 
spent on TPCI, there would have been medical care savings of $87.24 vs. $4.32, given the reality of 
the tax ballot measure failing. When all of the costs for the tobacco tax campaign are included (i.e., 
costs of education and political campaigns), the benefit-to-cost ratio is still large, $44.07, despite 
more than $7 million having been spent.
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A Closer Look at Benefits Associated with the 
School and Workplace Strategies
The activities and potential outcomes for the workplace and school strategies are more 
complicated than they might first appear. Thus, they warrant closer examination and additional 
interpretation of the results. For example, for workplaces, it is not simply adults quitting due to 
smoking cessation classes that accounts for the positive outcomes, but also the smokefree policy 
changes that have occurred in businesses and communities. Likewise, for the school initiative, it 
is not only the number of youth who will not initiate smoking, but also the policies youth have 
advocated for and helped to pass in their schools, individual businesses, and communities.
Therefore, in Table 4, additional detail has been provided regarding the benefits of TPCI for the 
two strategies. Smokefree policy changes show the greatest amount of benefit, particularly for 
community-wide policies. Grantees from both the school and workplace strategies were involved 
in advocating for policy changes. We estimate that 1,973 adults in Missouri quit smoking due to 
community-wide policy changes and an additional 111 adults quit smoking due to worksite policy 
changes. As a result of TPCI supported cessation programs, an estimated 902 adults quit smoking, 
and stayed quit. For the school programs, we estimate that 150 school-aged children who would 
have initiated smoking were prevented from doing so.
Center for Tobacco Policy Research          Page 8
Table 4. Benefits from Each Component of the School and Workplace Strategies
Smokefree Policy Changes
Number of Adults Who Would Quit
  Community-wide policy changes  




  Community-wide policy changes  
  Worksite policy changes
3,117
175
Long-Term Medical Care Savings to Society
  Community-wide policy changes  




Number of Adults Who Quit  902
QALYs Gained 1,425
Long-Term Medical Care Savings to Society $8,326,362
Youth Education
Youth Who Will Not Start Smoking Due to Education Programs 150
QALYs Gained 510
Long-Term Medical Care Savings to Society $2,953,736
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Conclusions
The results of our economic evaluation for TPCI during the specified time period show a 
net positive benefit across the entire initiative, as well as for the workplace and youth 
prevention strategies individually. Given the failure to increase the Missouri tobacco tax in 
2006, the separate economic evaluation for the strategy to raise support for the tax increase 
resulted in a net loss of the entire amount of MFH’s investment in the educational campaign, 
as well a total loss of investment by others who funded the political campaign. Had the tobacco 
tax ballot initiative passed, the strategy would have resulted in large benefits both in regard 
to QALYs and long-term medical savings for the people of Missouri.  The additional benefits 
from the success of the tobacco tax strategy would have increased the positive net benefit of 
TPCI twenty-fold.
These results provide valuable lessons learned and important information for future TPCI efforts, 
other tobacco prevention efforts, and decisions regarding MFH’s future efforts to improve the 
health of Missourians in its service area. Due to current plans for the initiative to continue an 
additional four years, the information presented in this report should inform future decisions on 
interventions to support within TPCI as well as the level of resources to dedicate to TPCI efforts. 
Recommendations
Prioritize increasing the tax on tobacco products to yield significant long-term savings
The lost opportunity represented by the failure of the tobacco tax shows the value of increasing 
the tax in Missouri. This poses the question of how much should be invested in a future effort 
to increase the tobacco tax given the large benefits that would be seen. Based on the findings of 
this report and evidence-based guidelines for tobacco control (e.g., The Community Guide), it is 
recommended that MFH support efforts to increase Missouri’s tobacco tax. 
Incorporate policy interventions at each level 
of programming to realize savings
The results demonstrate the potential 
power of both a statewide initiative and 
individual strategies that incorporate 
different levels of intervention to reduce 
tobacco use (community vs. workplaces/
schools vs. individual youth prevention 
and adult cessation efforts). Many of the 
grantees that focused on adult smoking 
cessation or youth prevention incorporated 
policy interventions. Were it not for these 
incorporated policy interventions, the 
overall findings for cost-benefit and 
cost-effectiveness would have resulted in 
a net loss for MFH. 
Recommendations
l	Advocate for an increase in the 
  tobacco tax.
l  Emphasize policy interventions as a   
  main component of a comprehensive  
  effort to reduce tobacco use.
l  Continue to conduct cost analyses for  
  the Tobacco Prevention and Cessation  
  Initiative and expand the practice to 
  all Missouri Foundation for Health 
  initiatives.   
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These findings strengthen the idea, both in theory and common sense, that policies prohibiting 
smoking promote quitting and adults who want to quit benefit from readily available and 
accessible smoking cessation services. Likewise, youth who never initiate and adults who quit are 
much more likely to advocate for policies to prohibit tobacco use in public places and are more 
likely to support future efforts to raise the state tobacco tax.14,15
Plan and conduct similar analyses across MFH programs to allow for program comparisons
Even with the failure of the tax initiative, our results demonstrate a net-positive benefit for TPCI 
overall. Similar efforts to collect cost and benefits for current and future funding programs would 
allow comparisons of the relative cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness of MFH’s funded projects 
across the main causes of morbidity and mortality and across the strategies adopted by MFH 
and its grantees. There is one caveat with this recommendation. Programs focused on other areas 
of chronic disease, such as physical activity, nutrition and chronic disease management, do not 
have as extensive of a science base as tobacco control. This influences the availability of data to 
adequately assess the outcomes for a specific strategy.
Limitations
As with all evaluations generally, and economic evaluations specifically, this work has limitations. 
The limitations include design issues, data concerns and the many assumptions made in 
conducting any cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. The design issues primarily relate 
to our decisions to use two standard measures to calculate benefits, QALYs and long-term 
medical savings. Establishing standard, common measures applicable across the three strategies 
was necessary to make comparisons among the three and to combine them to measure a total 
benefit for TPCI. This is the accepted practice for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. 
This approach likely underestimated the value of the benefit for TPCI since the value of practices 
such as capacity-building and recruiting tobacco prevention advocates for life was not included. 
Additionally, outcomes other than smokers who quit and youth who will not start smoking, such 
as reduced exposure to secondhand smoke, were not included.
The data concerns primarily relate to the total absence of some important data (e.g., volunteer 
hours) and the absence of periods of data. These problems result in a less than ideal database 
when forced to restrict the analyses to several years’ worth of TPCI and eliminate a small number 
of grantees from the analysis. Although we would have preferred to have full data, we do not 
believe that these data problems skew the findings in either direction since neither the cost nor 
benefits associated with either the excluded years or grantees was included in the analyses.
The final set of limitations concerns the many assumptions that must be made when conducting 
economic evaluations. These assumptions are comprehensively and clearly described in an 
appendix to this report. All of our assumptions are based on the best information available from 
published, peer-reviewed literature and recognized, reputable organizations. In all cases, we have 
made the most conservative assumptions. Given this approach, if our assumptions have produced 
biased results, they are much more likely to have underestimated, not overestimated, the benefits 
of the three strategies and the overall initiative.
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Appendix- Assumptions
Strategy 1 (Increase Tobacco Tax)
Costs
 1. Cost of MFH staff salaries, benefits, etc. not included.
 2. Cost of evaluation and training contracts not included. 
 3. Number of volunteer hours not included. Data are not available. 
Benefits
 1. For the actual outcome of tax initiative analysis (“Factual”):
    a. Assumed no benefits given that the tobacco tax initiative failed; adults influenced to    
      quit or kids influenced not to start because of the educational campaign (Show 
      Me Health) are assumed to be minimal.
 2. For the “Scenario” analyses: 
    a. The age categories for price elasticity (i.e., price effects on smoking) from the literature   
      (Chaloupka, 1999 and Ahmad & Franz, 2008) and the BRFSS Smoking Prevalence 
      Rates  for Missouri were not a perfect match; the categories were matched as closely 
      as possible.
    b. Weighted the decrease in prevalence for smoking among the Missouri population age   
      categories by the percentage in those categories; that weighted average was 4.41%.
    c. Divided the price elasticity (i.e., price effects on smoking) for each age group in half     
      because the reported price elasticity is for a decrease in the number of cigarettes       
      consumed; half of the elasticity is the actual reduction in prevalence. For every 10% 
      increase in the tobacco tax, the following percentages were used to calculate the       
      anticipated reduction in prevalence for each age group:
Age             15-17  18-23  24-29  30-39  40-65  65+ 
Anticipated %         4.2%    1.8%   1.5%   1.0%   1.0%    1.6% 
decrease in prevalence   
Source: Chaloupka, 1999 and Ahmad & Franz, 2008
   d. Used the reported 1.58 increase in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) for each sustained   
     quitter (Keeler et al, 2002 and Ong & Glantz, 2005). This estimate assumes: 
      i.  The average quitter is 45 years of age.
      ii. The benefits of quitting cease after age 65.
      iii. A discount rate of 3%.
      iv. A 35% probability of relapse.
      v. A compensation for background quits which would have occurred in the future 
        can be achieved by multiplying the QALYs by a factor of 0.79.
   e. Lifetime expenditure savings from quitting (Hodgson, 1992) were updated for inflation   
     between 1992 and 2007 and were gender-adjusted based on the percent population of 
     males and females in Missouri in 2007.
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Costs
 1. Cost of MFH staff salaries, benefits, trainings for grantees, evaluation contracts, etc. 
   was not included.
 2. Cost of expansion of Quitline services was not included. 
 3. Mean hourly wage for all occupations in Missouri in 2007 ($17.90) was used to calculate     
   value of volunteer time (Sources: TIES for number of volunteer hours; Bureau of 
   Labor Statistics for mean hourly wage).
 4. Removed funding for grantees for whom we do not have programmatic data.
Benefits
 1. Followed procedure in the Ong & Glantz 2005 paper to determine number of smokers who   
   would quit if a smoke-free worksite policy passed. The procedure accounts for:
    a. Smokers who would quit anyway, without a policy.
    b. A 90% compliance with the policy change (only for community-wide policies, 
      not individual worksite policies).
    c. A 35% relapse rate for quitters.
 2. Calculated number of smokers who quit because of cessation classes using TIES quit rate    
   data; assumes 35% probability of relapse and is discounted at 3%.
 3. Used the reported 1.58 increase in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) for each sustained     
   quitter (Keeler, et al, 2002 and Ong & Glantz, 2005). This estimate assumes: 
    a. Average quitter is 45 years of age.
    b. Benefits of quitting cease after age 65.
    c. Discount rate of 3%.
    d. 35% probability of relapse.
    e. Compensation for background quits that would have occurred in the future can 
      be achieved by multiplying the QALYs by a factor of 0.79.
 4. Lifetime medical expenditure savings from quitting (Hodgson, 1992) were updated for      
   inflation  between 1992 and 2007 and were gender-adjusted based on the percent population  
   of males and females in Missouri in 2007.
 5. Benefits from the Kirksville community-wide smoke-free policy were equally divided among  
   the workplace and school strategies because both were involved in its passage.
 6. Did not include benefits from removal of exposure to second-hand smoke 
   (e.g., health benefits).
Strategy 3 (School Programs)
Costs
 1. Cost of MFH staff salaries, benefits, trainings for grantees, evaluation contracts, etc. 
   was not included.
 2. Median hourly wage for Missouri high school teachers in 2007 ($21) was used to calculate    
   value of volunteer time since most volunteers were teachers for the school programs       
   (Sources: TIES for number of volunteer hours; Bureau of Labor Statistics for teacher median  
   hourly wage).
 3. Removed funding for grantees for whom we do not have programmatic data.
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Benefits
 1. For school-based interventions:
    a. Took the most conservative approach to estimating the number of youth affected by the  
      intervention; we counted only the students trained to be active participants, 
      not all youth exposed. The exception was one program involving lessons and activities
      conducted in the classroom. For this program, we also counted students in the classroom.
    b. Used the rate of youth initiation (0.1021) for the entire U.S. in 2003.
    c. Used the reported 10% decrease in initiation rate reported in the IOM report , Ending the  
      Tobacco Problem: A Blueprint for a Nation, to determine how many youth would not initiate 
      smoking due to programs.
    d. Used the reported 3.4 increase in QALYs for each youth who doesn’t start smoking     
      (Kaplan et al. and Holtgrave et al.), discounted at 3%
    e. Lifetime medical expenditure savings for youth who never start smoking (Hodgson,    
      1992) were updated for inflation between 1992 and 2007 and were gender-adjusted 
      based on the percent population of males and females in Missouri in 2007.
 2. For worksite smoke-free policies involving students:
    a. Same assumptions as described in worksite section above.
 3. Benefits from the Kirksville community-wide smoke-free policy were equally divided among  
   the workplace and school strategies because both indicated involvement in its passage.

